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Ms. Marilyn Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Defendant/Appellant Christopher Cheeney ("Appellant") hereby 
notifies the Court of the following pertinent and significant 
authority that came to Appellant's attention after the Reply 
Brief was filed: 
State v. Powasnik, Case No. 960116-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
filed May 31, 1996). 
A copy of the Powasnik decision is enclosed. 
The Powasnik case pertains to the following page(s) of 
Appellant's briefs in support of Appellant's argument that, 
contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) 
(1995),1 the penalty enhancement provisions of Section 
1
 Subsection (5) (a) states that the gang enhancement provisions do 
"not create any separate offense" (see Appellant's Brief, dated February 
16, 1996, at 9-10); and subsection (5) (c) interferes with the fact-
finding functions of the jury by specifying that the "sentencing judge 
rather than the jury shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty 
under this section." 
Ms. Marilyn Branch 
Page Two 
June 7, 1996 
76-3-203.1 add elements to the underlying offense that must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury: 
Reply Brief, dated June 3, 1996, at 10-11; 
Brief of Appellant, dated February 16, 1996, at Point I.B.I. 
The Statute Interferes with a Defendant's Right to Be 
Presumed Innocent Until the Elements of the Offense Are 
Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt; and 
Brief of Appellant, dated February 16, 1996, at Point I.B.2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 Interferes with a Criminal 
Defendant's Right to a Jury. 
Respectfully yours, 
(J 
Linda M. JonesQ 
Attorney 
Encl. 
Ms. Marilyn Branch 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered seven (7) copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four (4) copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. 0. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this TUL day of June, 
1996. 
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M. JONES 
DELIVERED this day of June, 1996. 
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JUN 71996 
P. ESPINOZA 
FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. MAY 3 1 1996 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COURT OF APPEALS 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Case No. 96011S-CA v. 
Joseph P. Powasnik, 
Defendant and Appellant 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable Gordon J. Low 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
F I L E D 
(May 31, 1996) 
Attorneys: Blaine Perry McBride, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Joseph P. Powasnik appeals his conviction for distribution 
of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public park, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(5) (a) (ix) (1996) . The State concedes the trial court 
incorrectly treated the issue of the offense's proximity to a 
public park as a sentencing question rather than an element of 
the offense to be decided by the jury. Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
After an investigation by the Tri-County Narcotics Task 
Force, officers arrested Powasnik. The State charged Powasnik 
with distributing methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1996). The 
State also alleged the offense occurred within 1000 feet of a 
public park in Logan, Utah; thus, upon conviction Powasnik would 
be subject to the penalties of a first degree felony pursuant to 
section 58-37-8(5) of the Utah Code. 
Before trial, the court announced it would proceed as 
follows: 
If the jury finds those facts [supporting 
conviction for distribution of a controlled 
substance] to be true beyond a reasonable 
doubt, they may return a verdict of guilt. 
When that occurs, if it does, the court, 
then, would hear evidence from Mr. Jenkins in 
behalf of the State as to if it occurred 
within 1000 feet of a park. If I find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that that in fact occurred 
then there would be the enhancement. 
The jury found Powasnik guilty of distributing a controlled 
substance. Two weeks later, the trial court convened a bench 
hearing to determine whether the offense occurred within 1000 
feet of a public park. 
At that hearing, the officer who measured the distance 
between the residence where the drugs were sold and Merlin Olsen 
Park testified it was 800 feet. The officer also testified he 
did not Know whether the pedometer he used to measure the 
distance had been calibrated. The State offered to provide 
evidence of the pedometer's calibration or to remeasure the 
distance. Rather than accept the State's offer, the trial court 
instead asked the officer how many blocks separated the residence 
in question from the park. The officer responded the residence 
was approximately twenty feet from the corner of 200 East and 200 
South, and the distance from there to the park was only one 
block. 
The trial court announced it would take judicial notice of 
the length of blocks in Logan and the location of the house and 
the park. The trial court further stated: 
Whether this court can take judicial notice 
or not, I am fully aware that the blocks in 
Logan are about 800 feet. I'm not unfamiliar 
with that location, it having been described 
both at trial and otherwise. I find that in 
fact the occurrence was within 1000 feet of a 
park. The conviction, then, will be enhanced 
to a first degree felony. 
The trial court consequently sentenced Powasnik to a first degree 
felony, and Powasnik now appeals. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We address a single issue on appeal: whether the penalty 
enhancement provisions of section 58-37-8(5) constitute an 
element of the underlying offense that must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decided guilt on 
the predicate crime.1 A trial court's interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law that we review for correctness. 
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). We accord no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions arising from its 
interpretation. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
It is well-established that defendants convicted of 
distributing, possessing, or manufacturing controlled substances 
are subject to enhanced penalties if their offense occurred 
within 1000 feet of certain public places, such as schools and 
public parks. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (1996); State v. 
Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 502-05 (Utah 1989); State v. Viah, 871 P. 2d 
1030, 1035 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 58-
61 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
And today we explicitly announce the penalty enhancement statute 
adds an extra element to those drug offenses that must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decides 
the predicate offense. 
In prior Utah cases interpreting the penalty 
enhancement statute, the trier of fact for the predicate offense 
always has been the same trier of fact who found the offense 
occurred within the requisite 1000 feet of a specified public 
place. See, e.g., Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1035. Here, on the other 
hand, a jury found Powasnik guilty of distribution while the 
trial court found the offense occurred within 1000 feet of a 
public park. Powasnik's case thus presents a question of first 
impression and requires us to interpret the relationship between 
the subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996) . 
The penalty enhancement provision provides, in relevant 
part: 
Notwithstanding other provisions of this 
section, a person not authorized under this 
1. Because we conclude the trial court erred when it declined to 
submit the issue of the 1000-foot penalty enhancement to the jury 
and instead conducted its own "sentence enhancement hearing," we 
do not analyze issues arising from that hearing. 
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chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section . . . is upon 
conviction subject to the f^nhancedl 
penalties and classifications under 
Subsection 5(b) if the act is committed fin, 
on. or within 1000 feet of specified public 
places! • 
IsL. § 58-37-8 (5) (a) (1996) (emphasis added). The legislature 
enacted the penalty enhancement statute in 1986 "to protect the 
public health, safety, and welfare of children of Utah from the 
presumed extreme potential danger created when drug transactions 
occur on or near a school ground [or other public places 
frequented by children]." Moore. 782 P.2d at 503. Thus, the 
law's overarching purpose is to create "drug-free zones" around 
schools and other specified places "to protect children from the 
influence of drug-related activity." Strombercr, 783 P. 2d at 60. 
The statute achieves that goal by increasing penalties for drug 
offenses committed within 1000 feet of specified public places. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (1996). 
The text of the statute suggests the same trier of fact who 
determines the underlying charge of distribution, manufacture, or 
possession also must decide the question of distance. The phrase 
"upon conviction" used together with the phrase "if the act is 
committed" indicates that defendants' sentences will be enhanced 
automatically when the trier of fact finds them guilty of 
possession, distribution, or manufacturing and finds that they 
committed the offense within 1000 feet of a prohibited place. 
The penalty enhancement subsection depends upon the subsections 
defining unlawful acts. The statute thus requires the same trier 
of fact who found the defendant guilty of an underlying offense 
to answer simultaneously the question of where the defendant 
committed the offense. 
Similarly, we previously have suggested the penalty 
enhancement statute creates an additional element for the 
underlying drug charge. In Stromberg. we observed, "the crime 
for which defendant stands convicted is identical to the offense 
of possessing controlled substances, except for the additional 
element that the offense must occur with 1,000 feet of a school.11 
783 P.2d at 60 (emphasis added). The penalty enhancement statute 
incorporates questions of location and distance into the 
underlying offense. The State must prove those additional facts 
to the trier of fact who finds defendants guilty of the predicate 
crime. £££ McMillan v. Pennsylvania. 477 U.S. 79, 84, 106 S. Ct. 
2411, 2415 (1986) (observing "'the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged.'" (quoting In re Winshio, 397 U.S. 358, 
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364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970))). In essence, the penalty 
enhancement constitutes a distinct crime separate and apart from 
possession, distribution, or manufacture of a controlled 
substance. 
Utah modeled its drug penalty enhancement statute after the 
Federal Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984. 
See Tape of House Floor Debates, 44th Legislature, General 
Session (Feb. 12, 1986) (Statement of Rep. Moss); see also Vigh. 
871 P.2d at 1035; Strombercr. 783 P.2d at 59 n.3. Compare 21 
U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994) (federal penalty enhancement provision) 
with Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (1996) (Utah's penalty 
enhancement provision) . Federal case law thus serves as 
persuasive authority in determining the proper procedure for 
prosecuting the 1000-foot penalty enhancement. 
Federal courts uniformly have held the penalty enhancement 
statute creates an additional element for the underlying crime 
that must be proved to the same trier of fact. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Ashley. 26 F.3d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir.) (collecting 
similar cases), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 348 (1994); United 
States v. Smith. 13 F.3d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating 
statute "constitutes an 'offense' which has as an element of 
proof that the distribution occurred within 1,000 feet of a 
protected place'1); United States v. Freyre-Lazaro. 3 F.3d 1496, 
1507 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding predicate crime is lesser included 
offense of penalty enhancement statute), cert, denied. 114 S. Ct. 
1385 (1994); United States v. Scott. 987 F.2d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 
1993) (same); United States v, ThcrntQU, 901 F.2d 738, 741 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (stating statute "incorporates the sentencing 
enhancement element into the underlying offense"); United States 
v. Holland. 810 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir.) (stating statute 
"adds an element to the offense" that must be "proved"), cert. 
denied, 481 u.s. 1057, 107 s. ct. 2199 (1987). 
In the present case, the trial court incorrectly reserved 
the issue of the 1000-foot penalty enhancement for a separate 
sentencing hearing. The trial court failed to note and 
effectuate the relationship between the several subsections of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996). Section 58-37-8(5) 
"incorporates the sentencing enhancement element into the 
underlying offense." Thornton. 901 F.2d at 741. Consequently, 
the question of where the underlying drug offense took place must 
be determined by the same trier of fact who decides whether 
defendants are guilty of possession, distribution, or manufacture 
of a controlled substance. 
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CONCLUSION 
We hold Utah's drug penalty enhancement statute creates an 
additional element: for the underlying offenses of distribution, 
possession, or manufacture of a controlled substance. That 
additional element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to 
the same trier of fact who decides the predicate crime. The 
State concedes the trial court incorrectly reserved the issue of 
the 1000-foot penalty enhancement until Powasnik's sentencing. 
Accordingly, we vacate Powasnik's conviction for a first-degree 
felony, enter a judgment of conviction for a second-degree 
felony, and remand to the trial court for imposition of 
sentence.2 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
2. Utah appellate courts may modify criminal convictions and 
enter judgments of conviction for a lesser included offense on 
appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1995); ^afp v. Dunn. 850 
P.2d 1201, 1209-11 (Utah 1993). 
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